{ "document": { "category": "csaf_base", "csaf_version": "2.0", "distribution": { "tlp": { "label": "WHITE" } }, "lang": "en", "notes": [ { "category": "legal_disclaimer", "text": "The Netherlands Cyber Security Center (henceforth: NCSC-NL) maintains this portal to enhance access to its information and vulnerabilities. The use of this information is subject to the following terms and conditions:\n\nThe vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal are gathered by NCSC-NL from a variety of open sources, which the user can retrieve from other platforms. NCSC-NL makes every reasonable effort to ensure that the content of this portal is kept up to date, and that it is accurate and complete. Nevertheless, NCSC-NL cannot entirely rule out the possibility of errors, and therefore cannot give any warranty in respect of its completeness, accuracy or real-time keeping up-to-date. NCSC-NL does not control nor guarantee the accuracy, relevance, timeliness or completeness of information obtained from these external sources. The vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal are intended solely for the convenience of professional parties to take appropriate measures to manage the risks posed to the cybersecurity. No rights can be derived from the information provided therein.\n\nNCSC-NL and the Kingdom of the Netherlands assume no legal liability or responsibility for any damage resulting from either the use or inability of use of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal. This includes damage resulting from the inaccuracy of incompleteness of the information contained in it.\nThe information on this page is subject to Dutch law. All disputes related to or arising from the use of this portal regarding the disclosure of vulnerabilities will be submitted to the competent court in The Hague. This choice of means also applies to the court in summary proceedings." } ], "publisher": { "category": "coordinator", "contact_details": "cert@ncsc.nl", "name": "National Cyber Security Centre", "namespace": "https://www.ncsc.nl/" }, "title": "CVE-2026-27111", "tracking": { "current_release_date": "2026-03-21T20:19:38.642315Z", "generator": { "date": "2026-02-17T15:00:00Z", "engine": { "name": "V.E.L.M.A", "version": "1.7" } }, "id": "CVE-2026-27111", "initial_release_date": "2026-02-19T15:39:45.423892Z", "revision_history": [ { "date": "2026-02-19T15:39:45.423892Z", "number": "1", "summary": "CVE created.| Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (3).| CWES updated (1)." }, { "date": "2026-02-19T15:39:50.352656Z", "number": "2", "summary": "NCSC Score created." }, { "date": "2026-02-20T21:38:35.261883Z", "number": "3", "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| Products created (1).| References created (2).| CWES updated (1)." }, { "date": "2026-02-20T21:38:39.398096Z", "number": "4", "summary": "NCSC Score updated." }, { "date": "2026-02-20T22:25:12.427714Z", "number": "5", "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (2).| CWES updated (1)." }, { "date": "2026-02-20T22:25:15.827396Z", "number": "6", "summary": "NCSC Score updated." }, { "date": "2026-02-21T07:35:19.279602Z", "number": "7", "summary": "NCSC Score updated." }, { "date": "2026-02-21T14:14:50.930699Z", "number": "8", "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| EPSS created." }, { "date": "2026-02-21T14:14:52.479729Z", "number": "9", "summary": "NCSC Score updated." }, { "date": "2026-02-21T17:48:05.793349Z", "number": "10", "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| Products created (3).| References created (4).| CWES updated (1)." }, { "date": "2026-02-21T17:48:15.090944Z", "number": "11", "summary": "NCSC Score updated." }, { "date": "2026-02-23T00:12:34.258311Z", "number": "12", "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| Products connected (1).| References created (2).| CWES updated (1)." }, { "date": "2026-02-23T22:39:49.893232Z", "number": "13", "summary": "References created (1)." }, { "date": "2026-02-23T22:39:52.540776Z", "number": "14", "summary": "NCSC Score updated." }, { "date": "2026-02-24T00:12:33.506694Z", "number": "15", "summary": "References created (1)." }, { "date": "2026-02-24T00:13:01.142608Z", "number": "16", "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| References created (2)." }, { "date": "2026-02-24T19:52:17.283105Z", "number": "17", "summary": "Unknown change." }, { "date": "2026-02-24T19:52:19.503079Z", "number": "18", "summary": "NCSC Score updated." }, { "date": "2026-02-25T18:26:54.660937Z", "number": "19", "summary": "CVSS created.| Products connected (1).| Product Identifiers created (1)." }, { "date": "2026-02-25T18:27:02.913999Z", "number": "20", "summary": "NCSC Score updated." }, { "date": "2026-03-20T09:42:35.133691Z", "number": "21", "summary": "Source connected.| CVE status created. (valid)| EPSS created." }, { "date": "2026-03-21T18:47:36.421866Z", "number": "22", "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| Products created (2).| References created (5).| CWES updated (1)." } ], "status": "interim", "version": "22" } }, "product_tree": { "branches": [ { "branches": [ { "branches": [ { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:unknown/1.9.3", "product": { "name": "vers:unknown/1.9.3", "product_id": "CSAFPID-5888526" } }, { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:unknown/>=1.9.0|<1.9.3", "product": { "name": "vers:unknown/>=1.9.0|<1.9.3", "product_id": "CSAFPID-5888527" } } ], "category": "product_name", "name": "go/github.com/akuity/kargo" }, { "branches": [ { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:unknown/>=1.9.0|<1.9.3", "product": { "name": "vers:unknown/>=1.9.0|<1.9.3", "product_id": "CSAFPID-5653678", "product_identification_helper": { "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:akuity:kargo:*:*:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*" } } }, { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:unknown/v1.9.0", "product": { "name": "vers:unknown/v1.9.0", "product_id": "CSAFPID-5659522" } }, { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:unknown/v1.9.1", "product": { "name": "vers:unknown/v1.9.1", "product_id": "CSAFPID-5659523" } }, { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:unknown/v1.9.2", "product": { "name": "vers:unknown/v1.9.2", "product_id": "CSAFPID-5659524" } } ], "category": "product_name", "name": "kargo" } ], "category": "vendor", "name": "akuity" } ] }, "vulnerabilities": [ { "cve": "CVE-2026-27111", "cwe": { "id": "CWE-862", "name": "Missing Authorization" }, "notes": [ { "category": "description", "text": "## Summary\n\nKargo's authorization model includes a `promote` verb -- a non-standard Kubernetes [\"dolphin verb\"](https://www.aquasec.com/blog/kubernetes-verbs/) -- that gates the ability to advance `Freight` through a promotion pipeline. This verb exists to separate the ability to _manage_ promotion-related resources from the ability to _trigger_ promotions, enabling fine-grained access control over what is often a sensitive operation.\n\nThe `promote` verb is correctly enforced in Kargo's legacy gRPC API. However, three endpoints in the newer REST API omit this check, relying only on standard Kubernetes RBAC for the underlying resource operations (`patch` on `freights/status` or `create` on `promotions`). This permits users who hold those standard permissions -- but who were deliberately _not_ granted `promote` -- to bypass the intended authorization boundary.\n\nThe affected endpoints are:\n\n1. `POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/freight/{freight}/approve`\n\n Approves `Freight` for promotion to a specific `Stage`.\n\n The endpoint is intended to require both `patch` permission on `Freight` status and `promote` permission on the target `Stage`, but asserts only the former.\n\n2. `POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions`\n\n Promotes `Freight` to a specific `Stage`.\n\n The endpoint is intended to require both `create` permission on `Promotion` resources and `promote` permission on the target `Stage`, but asserts only the former.\n\n3. `POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions/downstream`\n\n Promotes `Freight` to all `Stage`s immediately downstream of a given `Stage`.\n\n The endpoint is intended to require both `create` permission on `Promotion` resources and `promote` permission on each downstream `Stage`, but asserts only the former.\n\n## Base Metrics\n\nThe following sections provide the rationale for the values selected for each of CVSS v4's base metrics.\n\n### Attack Vector (AV): Network\n\nThe affected endpoints are part of Kargo's newer REST API, which is served over HTTP/HTTPS. (The analogous endpoints of the legacy gRPC API correctly check `promote` permission and are not affected.) No local or physical access is required.\n\n### Attack Complexity (AC): Low\n\nThe attack requires only well-formed API requests to the affected endpoints.\n\n### Attack Requirements (AT): None\n\nNo specific environmental conditions are required beyond those that are typical for any Kargo instance.\n\n### Privileges Required (PR): Low\n\nThe attacker must hold permissions to patch `Freight` status and/or create `Promotion` resources. These are standard operational permissions commonly granted to some Kargo users and do not represent what CVSS formally considers administrative or elevated access.\n\n### User Interaction (UI): None\n\nThe attack is fully automated via API calls. No other user needs to take any action.\n\n### Confidentiality Impact to Vulnerable System (VC): None\n\nThe vulnerability does not expose any data from the Kargo control plane.\n\n### Integrity Impact to Vulnerable System (VI): Low\n\nThe attacker can coerce a `Stage` into a state it might not otherwise transition to. This constitutes bounded state corruption within a single Project. Kargo itself continues to function correctly.\n\n### Availability Impact to Vulnerable System (VA): None\n\n`Promotion` resources created by exploitation of this vulnerability consume the same controller resources as a legitimate `Promotion` would. A user with proper `promote` permissions could generate identical load. The vulnerability does not introduce any new avenue for resource exhaustion.\n\n### Confidentiality Impact to Subsequent Systems (SC): None\n\nThe vulnerability does not provide any mechanism for the attacker to read data from downstream systems.\n\n### Integrity Impact to Subsequent Systems (SI): Low\n\nCritically, the attacker does not control the _content_ of `Freight` resources without artifact repositories also having been compromised. In isolation, which is how vulnerabilities are scored, the worst consequence of a successful attack is downstream systems (e.g. Argo CD) deploying incorrect revisions of artifacts, which in some cases should have been rejected by bypassed segments of the promotion pipeline. Though the operational consequences land on subsequent systems, they are bounded by the attacker's inability to inject arbitrary content.\n\n### Availability Impact to Subsequent Systems (SA): None\n\nThe attack does not provide any mechanism to degrade the availability of downstream systems beyond what could be achieved with legitimately promoted `Freight`.\n\n## Mitigating Factors\n\n- Only the REST API endpoints introduced in v1.9.0 are affected. The legacy gRPC API and the Kargo UI (which uses the gRPC API) correctly enforce the `promote` permission check and are not vulnerable.\n\n- The window of affected versions is narrow: v1.9.0 through v1.9.2.\n\n- Exploitation requires authentication to the Kargo API server and specific operational permissions (`patch` on `freights/status` or `create` on `promotions`). Anonymous or minimally privileged users cannot exploit this vulnerability.\n\n- Impact is bounded to a single Project. The `promote` bypass does not enable cross-Project access or escalation beyond the namespace in which the attacker already holds the prerequisite permissions.\n\n- There is no evidence of exploitation in the wild.", "title": "github - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4" }, { "category": "description", "text": "Kargo manages and automates the promotion of software artifacts. From v1.9.0 to v1.9.2, Kargo's authorization model includes a promote verb -- a non-standard Kubernetes \"dolphin verb\" -- that gates the ability to advance Freight through a promotion pipeline. This verb exists to separate the ability to manage promotion-related resources from the ability to trigger promotions, enabling fine-grained access control over what is often a sensitive operation. The promote verb is correctly enforced in Kargo's legacy gRPC API. However, three endpoints in the newer REST API omit this check, relying only on standard Kubernetes RBAC for the underlying resource operations (patch on freights/status or create on promotions). This permits users who hold those standard permissions -- but who were deliberately not granted promote -- to bypass the intended authorization boundary. The affected endpoints are /v1beta1/projects/{project}/freight/{freight}/approve, /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions, and /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions/downstream. This vulnerability is fixed in v1.9.3.", "title": "cveprojectv5 - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-27111" }, { "category": "description", "text": "Kargo manages and automates the promotion of software artifacts. From v1.9.0 to v1.9.2, Kargo's authorization model includes a promote verb -- a non-standard Kubernetes \"dolphin verb\" -- that gates the ability to advance Freight through a promotion pipeline. This verb exists to separate the ability to manage promotion-related resources from the ability to trigger promotions, enabling fine-grained access control over what is often a sensitive operation. The promote verb is correctly enforced in Kargo's legacy gRPC API. However, three endpoints in the newer REST API omit this check, relying only on standard Kubernetes RBAC for the underlying resource operations (patch on freights/status or create on promotions). This permits users who hold those standard permissions -- but who were deliberately not granted promote -- to bypass the intended authorization boundary. The affected endpoints are /v1beta1/projects/{project}/freight/{freight}/approve, /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions, and /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions/downstream. This vulnerability is fixed in v1.9.3.", "title": "nvd - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27111" }, { "category": "description", "text": "Kargo manages and automates the promotion of software artifacts. From v1.9.0 to v1.9.2, Kargo's authorization model includes a promote verb -- a non-standard Kubernetes \"dolphin verb\" -- that gates the ability to advance Freight through a promotion pipeline. This verb exists to separate the ability to manage promotion-related resources from the ability to trigger promotions, enabling fine-grained access control over what is often a sensitive operation. The promote verb is correctly enforced in Kargo's legacy gRPC API. However, three endpoints in the newer REST API omit this check, relying only on standard Kubernetes RBAC for the underlying resource operations (patch on freights/status or create on promotions). This permits users who hold those standard permissions -- but who were deliberately not granted promote -- to bypass the intended authorization boundary. The affected endpoints are /v1beta1/projects/{project}/freight/{freight}/approve, /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions, and /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions/downstream. This vulnerability is fixed in v1.9.3.", "title": "osv - https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/GIT%2FCVE-2026-27111.json?alt=media" }, { "category": "description", "text": "## Summary\n\nKargo's authorization model includes a `promote` verb -- a non-standard Kubernetes [\"dolphin verb\"](https://www.aquasec.com/blog/kubernetes-verbs/) -- that gates the ability to advance `Freight` through a promotion pipeline. This verb exists to separate the ability to _manage_ promotion-related resources from the ability to _trigger_ promotions, enabling fine-grained access control over what is often a sensitive operation.\n\nThe `promote` verb is correctly enforced in Kargo's legacy gRPC API. However, three endpoints in the newer REST API omit this check, relying only on standard Kubernetes RBAC for the underlying resource operations (`patch` on `freights/status` or `create` on `promotions`). This permits users who hold those standard permissions -- but who were deliberately _not_ granted `promote` -- to bypass the intended authorization boundary.\n\nThe affected endpoints are:\n\n1. `POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/freight/{freight}/approve`\n\n Approves `Freight` for promotion to a specific `Stage`.\n\n The endpoint is intended to require both `patch` permission on `Freight` status and `promote` permission on the target `Stage`, but asserts only the former.\n\n2. `POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions`\n\n Promotes `Freight` to a specific `Stage`.\n\n The endpoint is intended to require both `create` permission on `Promotion` resources and `promote` permission on the target `Stage`, but asserts only the former.\n\n3. `POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions/downstream`\n\n Promotes `Freight` to all `Stage`s immediately downstream of a given `Stage`.\n\n The endpoint is intended to require both `create` permission on `Promotion` resources and `promote` permission on each downstream `Stage`, but asserts only the former.\n\n## Base Metrics\n\nThe following sections provide the rationale for the values selected for each of CVSS v4's base metrics.\n\n### Attack Vector (AV): Network\n\nThe affected endpoints are part of Kargo's newer REST API, which is served over HTTP/HTTPS. (The analogous endpoints of the legacy gRPC API correctly check `promote` permission and are not affected.) No local or physical access is required.\n\n### Attack Complexity (AC): Low\n\nThe attack requires only well-formed API requests to the affected endpoints.\n\n### Attack Requirements (AT): None\n\nNo specific environmental conditions are required beyond those that are typical for any Kargo instance.\n\n### Privileges Required (PR): Low\n\nThe attacker must hold permissions to patch `Freight` status and/or create `Promotion` resources. These are standard operational permissions commonly granted to some Kargo users and do not represent what CVSS formally considers administrative or elevated access.\n\n### User Interaction (UI): None\n\nThe attack is fully automated via API calls. No other user needs to take any action.\n\n### Confidentiality Impact to Vulnerable System (VC): None\n\nThe vulnerability does not expose any data from the Kargo control plane.\n\n### Integrity Impact to Vulnerable System (VI): Low\n\nThe attacker can coerce a `Stage` into a state it might not otherwise transition to. This constitutes bounded state corruption within a single Project. Kargo itself continues to function correctly.\n\n### Availability Impact to Vulnerable System (VA): None\n\n`Promotion` resources created by exploitation of this vulnerability consume the same controller resources as a legitimate `Promotion` would. A user with proper `promote` permissions could generate identical load. The vulnerability does not introduce any new avenue for resource exhaustion.\n\n### Confidentiality Impact to Subsequent Systems (SC): None\n\nThe vulnerability does not provide any mechanism for the attacker to read data from downstream systems.\n\n### Integrity Impact to Subsequent Systems (SI): Low\n\nCritically, the attacker does not control the _content_ of `Freight` resources without artifact repositories also having been compromised. In isolation, which is how vulnerabilities are scored, the worst consequence of a successful attack is downstream systems (e.g. Argo CD) deploying incorrect revisions of artifacts, which in some cases should have been rejected by bypassed segments of the promotion pipeline. Though the operational consequences land on subsequent systems, they are bounded by the attacker's inability to inject arbitrary content.\n\n### Availability Impact to Subsequent Systems (SA): None\n\nThe attack does not provide any mechanism to degrade the availability of downstream systems beyond what could be achieved with legitimately promoted `Freight`.\n\n## Mitigating Factors\n\n- Only the REST API endpoints introduced in v1.9.0 are affected. The legacy gRPC API and the Kargo UI (which uses the gRPC API) correctly enforce the `promote` permission check and are not vulnerable.\n\n- The window of affected versions is narrow: v1.9.0 through v1.9.2.\n\n- Exploitation requires authentication to the Kargo API server and specific operational permissions (`patch` on `freights/status` or `create` on `promotions`). Anonymous or minimally privileged users cannot exploit this vulnerability.\n\n- Impact is bounded to a single Project. The `promote` bypass does not enable cross-Project access or escalation beyond the namespace in which the attacker already holds the prerequisite permissions.\n\n- There is no evidence of exploitation in the wild.", "title": "osv - https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/Go%2FGHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4.json?alt=media" }, { "category": "description", "text": "Kargo has Missing Authorization Vulnerabilities in Approval & Promotion REST API Endpoints in github.com/akuity/kargo", "title": "osv - https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/Go%2FGO-2026-4515.json?alt=media" }, { "category": "description", "text": "Kargo's authorization model includes a `promote` verb -- a non-standard Kubernetes [\"dolphin verb\"](https://www.aquasec.com/blog/kubernetes-verbs/) -- that gates the ability to advance `Freight` through a promotion pipeline. This verb exists to separate the ability to _manage_ promotion-related resources from the ability to _trigger_ promotions, enabling fine-grained access control over what is often a sensitive operation.\n\nThe `promote` verb is correctly enforced in Kargo's legacy gRPC API. However, three endpoints in the newer REST API omit this check, relying only on standard Kubernetes RBAC for the underlying resource operations (`patch` on `freights/status` or `create` on `promotions`). This permits users who hold those standard permissions -- but who were deliberately _not_ granted `promote` -- to bypass the intended authorization boundary.\n\nThe affected endpoints are:\n\n1. `POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/freight/{freight}/approve`\n\nApproves `Freight` for promotion to a specific `Stage`.\n\nThe endpoint is intended to require both `patch` permission on `Freight` status and `promote` permission on the target `Stage`, but asserts only the former.\n\n2. `POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions`\n\nPromotes `Freight` to a specific `Stage`.\n\nThe endpoint is intended to require both `create` permission on `Promotion` resources and `promote` permission on the target `Stage`, but asserts only the former.\n\n3. `POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions/downstream`\n\nPromotes `Freight` to all `Stage`s immediately downstream of a given `Stage`.\n\nThe endpoint is intended to require both `create` permission on `Promotion` resources and `promote` permission on each downstream `Stage`, but asserts only the former.", "title": "gitlab - https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/25847700/repository/files/go%2Fgithub.com%2Fakuity%2Fkargo%2FCVE-2026-27111.yml/raw" }, { "category": "other", "text": "0.00025", "title": "EPSS" }, { "category": "other", "text": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N", "title": "CVSSV4" }, { "category": "other", "text": "5.3", "title": "CVSSV4 base score" }, { "category": "other", "text": "4.5", "title": "NCSC Score" }, { "category": "other", "text": "The value of the most recent EPSS score", "title": "NCSC Score top decreasing factors" } ], "product_status": { "fixed": [ "CSAFPID-5888526" ], "known_affected": [ "CSAFPID-5653678", "CSAFPID-5659522", "CSAFPID-5659523", "CSAFPID-5659524", "CSAFPID-5888527" ] }, "references": [ { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - github", "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source raw - github", "url": "https://api.github.com/advisories/GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - cveprojectv5", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-27111" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source raw - cveprojectv5", "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/27xxx/CVE-2026-27111.json" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27111" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source raw - nvd", "url": "https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-27111" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - first", "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-27111" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source raw - first", "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?limit=10000&offset=0" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - osv", "url": "https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/GIT%2FCVE-2026-27111.json?alt=media" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - osv", "url": "https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/Go%2FGHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4.json?alt=media" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - osv", "url": "https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/Go%2FGO-2026-4515.json?alt=media" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - first", "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?limit=10000&offset=0" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - gitlab", "url": "https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/25847700/repository/files/go%2Fgithub.com%2Fakuity%2Fkargo%2FCVE-2026-27111.yml/raw" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Reference - cveprojectv5; github; gitlab; nvd; osv", "url": "https://github.com/akuity/kargo/security/advisories/GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Reference - cveprojectv5; github; gitlab; nvd; osv", "url": "https://github.com/akuity/kargo/commit/833314cad5513d48d89431493325ae44c1324a49" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Reference - github; gitlab", "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Reference - osv", "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/27xxx/CVE-2026-27111.json" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Reference - github; gitlab; osv", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27111" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Reference - gitlab", "url": "https://github.com/akuity/kargo" } ], "scores": [ { "cvss_v3": { "version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N", "baseScore": 5.0, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM" }, "products": [ "CSAFPID-5653678", "CSAFPID-5659522", "CSAFPID-5659523", "CSAFPID-5659524", "CSAFPID-5888527" ] } ], "title": "CVE-2026-27111" } ] }