{
    "document": {
        "category": "csaf_base",
        "csaf_version": "2.0",
        "distribution": {
            "tlp": {
                "label": "WHITE"
            }
        },
        "lang": "en",
        "notes": [
            {
                "category": "legal_disclaimer",
                "text": "The Netherlands Cyber Security Center (henceforth: NCSC-NL) maintains this portal to enhance access to its information and vulnerabilities. The use of this information is subject to the following terms and conditions:\n\nThe vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal are gathered by NCSC-NL from a variety of open sources, which the user can retrieve from other platforms. NCSC-NL makes every reasonable effort to ensure that the content of this portal is kept up to date, and that it is accurate and complete. Nevertheless, NCSC-NL cannot entirely rule out the possibility of errors, and therefore cannot give any warranty in respect of its completeness, accuracy or real-time keeping up-to-date. NCSC-NL does not control nor guarantee the accuracy, relevance, timeliness or completeness of information obtained from these external sources. The vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal are intended solely for the convenience of professional parties to take appropriate measures to manage the risks posed to the cybersecurity. No rights can be derived from the information provided therein.\n\nNCSC-NL and the Kingdom of the Netherlands assume no legal liability or responsibility for any damage resulting from either the use or inability of use of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal. This includes damage resulting from the inaccuracy of incompleteness of the information contained in it.\nThe information on this page is subject to Dutch law. All disputes related to or arising from the use of this portal regarding the disclosure of vulnerabilities will be submitted to the competent court in The Hague. This choice of means also applies to the court in summary proceedings."
            }
        ],
        "publisher": {
            "category": "coordinator",
            "contact_details": "cert@ncsc.nl",
            "name": "National Cyber Security Centre",
            "namespace": "https://www.ncsc.nl/"
        },
        "title": "CVE-2026-29783",
        "tracking": {
            "current_release_date": "2026-03-23T04:01:56.442881Z",
            "generator": {
                "date": "2026-02-17T15:00:00Z",
                "engine": {
                    "name": "V.E.L.M.A",
                    "version": "1.7"
                }
            },
            "id": "CVE-2026-29783",
            "initial_release_date": "2026-03-06T17:26:50.272980Z",
            "revision_history": [
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-06T17:26:50.272980Z",
                    "number": "1",
                    "summary": "CVE created.| Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (2).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-06T17:26:54.675355Z",
                    "number": "2",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score created."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-06T17:38:43.835364Z",
                    "number": "3",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| Products created (1).| References created (2).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-06T17:38:45.997452Z",
                    "number": "4",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-06T17:41:16.725466Z",
                    "number": "5",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (3).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-06T17:41:23.053481Z",
                    "number": "6",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-06T18:20:51.050974Z",
                    "number": "7",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| Products created (1).| References created (2).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-06T18:38:48.598014Z",
                    "number": "8",
                    "summary": "Unknown change."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-06T23:39:38.947418Z",
                    "number": "9",
                    "summary": "References created (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-07T00:21:04.093934Z",
                    "number": "10",
                    "summary": "References created (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-07T14:46:53.806610Z",
                    "number": "11",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| EPSS created."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-07T14:46:57.070215Z",
                    "number": "12",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-11T04:39:09.131234Z",
                    "number": "13",
                    "summary": "Unknown change."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-11T04:39:15.966534Z",
                    "number": "14",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-13T16:47:04.029347Z",
                    "number": "15",
                    "summary": "Description removed for source.| Description created for source."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-13T16:47:07.799490Z",
                    "number": "16",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-19T15:29:27.295647Z",
                    "number": "17",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (4).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-19T15:29:29.794697Z",
                    "number": "18",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-20T09:34:49.770053Z",
                    "number": "19",
                    "summary": "Source connected.| CVE status created. (valid)| EPSS created."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-20T09:34:53.760643Z",
                    "number": "20",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                }
            ],
            "status": "interim",
            "version": "20"
        }
    },
    "product_tree": {
        "branches": [
            {
                "branches": [
                    {
                        "branches": [
                            {
                                "category": "product_version_range",
                                "name": "vers:unknown/>=0|<0.0.423",
                                "product": {
                                    "name": "vers:unknown/>=0|<0.0.423",
                                    "product_id": "CSAFPID-5767217"
                                }
                            }
                        ],
                        "category": "product_name",
                        "name": "@github/copilot"
                    },
                    {
                        "branches": [
                            {
                                "category": "product_version_range",
                                "name": "vers:unknown/<=0.0.422",
                                "product": {
                                    "name": "vers:unknown/<=0.0.422",
                                    "product_id": "CSAFPID-5766948"
                                }
                            }
                        ],
                        "category": "product_name",
                        "name": "copilot-cli"
                    }
                ],
                "category": "vendor",
                "name": "github"
            }
        ]
    },
    "vulnerabilities": [
        {
            "cve": "CVE-2026-29783",
            "cwe": {
                "id": "CWE-78",
                "name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')"
            },
            "notes": [
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "The shell tool within GitHub Copilot CLI versions prior to and including 0.0.422 can allow arbitrary code execution through crafted bash parameter expansion patterns. An attacker who can influence the commands executed by the agent (e.g., via prompt injection through repository files, MCP server responses, or user instructions) can exploit bash parameter transformation operators to execute hidden commands, bypassing the safety assessment that classifies commands as \"read-only.\" This has been patched in version 0.0.423. \n\nThe vulnerability stems from how the CLI's shell safety assessment evaluates commands before execution. The safety layer parses and classifies shell commands as either read-only (safe) or write-capable (requires user approval). However, several bash parameter expansion features can embed executable code within arguments to otherwise read-only commands, causing them to appear safe while actually performing arbitrary operations.\n\nThe specific dangerous patterns are ${var@P}, ${var=value} / ${var:=value}, ${!var}, and nested $(cmd) or <(cmd) inside ${...} expansions. An attacker who can influence command text sent to the shell tool - for example, through prompt injection via malicious repository content (README files, code comments, issue bodies), compromised or malicious MCP server responses, or crafted user instructions containing obfuscated commands - could achieve arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation. This is possible even in permission modes that require user approval for write operations, since the commands can appear to use only read-only utilities to ultimately trigger write operations. Successful exploitation could lead to data exfiltration, file modification, or further system compromise.",
                    "title": "nvd - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29783"
                },
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "The shell tool within GitHub Copilot CLI versions prior to and including 0.0.422 can allow arbitrary code execution through crafted bash parameter expansion patterns. An attacker who can influence the commands executed by the agent (e.g., via prompt injection through repository files, MCP server responses, or user instructions) can exploit bash parameter transformation operators to execute hidden commands, bypassing the safety assessment that classifies commands as \"read-only.\" This has been patched in version 0.0.423. \n\nThe vulnerability stems from how the CLI's shell safety assessment evaluates commands before execution. The safety layer parses and classifies shell commands as either read-only (safe) or write-capable (requires user approval). However, several bash parameter expansion features can embed executable code within arguments to otherwise read-only commands, causing them to appear safe while actually performing arbitrary operations.\n\nThe specific dangerous patterns are ${var@P}, ${var=value} / ${var:=value}, ${!var}, and nested $(cmd) or <(cmd) inside ${...} expansions. An attacker who can influence command text sent to the shell tool - for example, through prompt injection via malicious repository content (README files, code comments, issue bodies), compromised or malicious MCP server responses, or crafted user instructions containing obfuscated commands - could achieve arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation. This is possible even in permission modes that require user approval for write operations, since the commands can appear to use only read-only utilities to ultimately trigger write operations. Successful exploitation could lead to data exfiltration, file modification, or further system compromise.",
                    "title": "cveprojectv5 - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-29783"
                },
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "## Summary\n\nA security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub Copilot CLI's shell tool that could allow arbitrary code execution through crafted bash parameter expansion patterns. An attacker who can influence the commands executed by the agent (e.g., via prompt injection through repository files, MCP server responses, or user instructions) can exploit bash parameter transformation operators to execute hidden commands, bypassing the safety assessment that classifies commands as \"read-only.\"\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability stems from how the CLI's shell safety assessment evaluates commands before execution. The safety layer parses and classifies shell commands as either read-only (safe) or write-capable (requires user approval). However, several bash parameter expansion features can embed executable code within arguments to otherwise read-only commands, causing them to appear safe while actually performing arbitrary operations.\n\nThe specific dangerous patterns are:\n\n1. **`${var@P}` — Prompt expansion:** The `@P` parameter transformation operator evaluates its value as a prompt string, which interprets embedded command substitutions. This allows hidden command execution inside what appears to be a simple variable reference.\n\n2. **`${var=value}` / `${var:=value}` — Assignment side-effects:** These forms assign values to variables as a side-effect of expansion. When chained with `@P`, an attacker can progressively build up a command substitution string across multiple expansions.\n\n3. **`${!var}` — Indirect expansion:** Dereferences an arbitrary variable name, which can be combined with other patterns to construct and execute commands dynamically.\n\n4. **Nested `$(cmd)` or `<(cmd)` inside `${...}` expansions:** Command substitution or process substitution embedded within parameter expansion default values (e.g., `${HOME:-$(whoami)}`) executes the nested command.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nThe following command appears to run a harmless `echo`, but actually executes `touch /tmp/pwned` through chained parameter expansion:\n\n```bash\necho ${a=\"$\"}${b=\"$a(touch /tmp/pwned)\"}${b@P}\n```\n\n**How it works:**\n- `${a=\"$\"}` assigns the literal `$` character to variable `a`\n- `${b=\"$a(touch /tmp/pwned)\"}` expands `$a` to `$`, constructing the string `$(touch /tmp/pwned)` and assigning it to `b`\n- `${b@P}` applies prompt expansion to `b`, which evaluates the embedded `$(touch /tmp/pwned)` command substitution\n\nPrior to the fix, the safety assessment would classify `echo` as a read-only command and allow execution without user confirmation — even in modes that normally require approval for write operations.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence command text sent to the shell tool — for example, through:\n- Prompt injection via malicious repository content (README files, code comments, issue bodies)\n- Compromised or malicious MCP server responses\n- Crafted user instructions containing obfuscated commands\n\n— could achieve arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation. This is possible even in permission modes that require user approval for write operations, since the commands can appear to be using only read-only utilities to ultimately trigger write operations.\n\nSuccessful exploitation could lead to data exfiltration, file modification, or further system compromise.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- GitHub Copilot CLI versions prior to 0.0.423\n\n## Remediation and Mitigation\n\n### Fix\n\nThe fix adds two layers of defense:\n\n1. **Parse-time detection:** The shell safety assessment analyzes `${...}` expansion nodes within bash commands, detecting dangerous operators (`@P`, `=`, `:=`, `!`) and nested command/process substitutions. Commands containing these patterns are downgraded from read-only to write-capable, ensuring they require user approval.\n\n2. **Unconditional blocking:** Commands with dangerous expansion patterns are unconditionally blocked at the tool execution layer — regardless of permission mode (including `--yolo` / autopilot). This prevents exploitation even when all commands are auto-approved.\n\n3. **System prompt hardening:** The bash shell tool's system prompt now includes explicit instructions for the LLM to refuse executing commands with these patterns, providing a defense-in-depth layer.\n\n### User Actions\n\n1. **Upgrade** GitHub Copilot CLI to **0.0.423** or later.\n2. **Exercise caution** when working in untrusted repositories or with untrusted MCP servers.\n3. **Review** any shell commands suggested by the agent that contain complex parameter expansion patterns.",
                    "title": "osv - https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/npm%2FGHSA-g8r9-g2v8-jv6f.json?alt=media"
                },
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "## Summary\n\nA security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub Copilot CLI's shell tool that could allow arbitrary code execution through crafted bash parameter expansion patterns. An attacker who can influence the commands executed by the agent (e.g., via prompt injection through repository files, MCP server responses, or user instructions) can exploit bash parameter transformation operators to execute hidden commands, bypassing the safety assessment that classifies commands as \"read-only.\"\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability stems from how the CLI's shell safety assessment evaluates commands before execution. The safety layer parses and classifies shell commands as either read-only (safe) or write-capable (requires user approval). However, several bash parameter expansion features can embed executable code within arguments to otherwise read-only commands, causing them to appear safe while actually performing arbitrary operations.\n\nThe specific dangerous patterns are:\n\n1. **`${var@P}` — Prompt expansion:** The `@P` parameter transformation operator evaluates its value as a prompt string, which interprets embedded command substitutions. This allows hidden command execution inside what appears to be a simple variable reference.\n\n2. **`${var=value}` / `${var:=value}` — Assignment side-effects:** These forms assign values to variables as a side-effect of expansion. When chained with `@P`, an attacker can progressively build up a command substitution string across multiple expansions.\n\n3. **`${!var}` — Indirect expansion:** Dereferences an arbitrary variable name, which can be combined with other patterns to construct and execute commands dynamically.\n\n4. **Nested `$(cmd)` or `<(cmd)` inside `${...}` expansions:** Command substitution or process substitution embedded within parameter expansion default values (e.g., `${HOME:-$(whoami)}`) executes the nested command.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nThe following command appears to run a harmless `echo`, but actually executes `touch /tmp/pwned` through chained parameter expansion:\n\n```bash\necho ${a=\"$\"}${b=\"$a(touch /tmp/pwned)\"}${b@P}\n```\n\n**How it works:**\n- `${a=\"$\"}` assigns the literal `$` character to variable `a`\n- `${b=\"$a(touch /tmp/pwned)\"}` expands `$a` to `$`, constructing the string `$(touch /tmp/pwned)` and assigning it to `b`\n- `${b@P}` applies prompt expansion to `b`, which evaluates the embedded `$(touch /tmp/pwned)` command substitution\n\nPrior to the fix, the safety assessment would classify `echo` as a read-only command and allow execution without user confirmation — even in modes that normally require approval for write operations.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence command text sent to the shell tool — for example, through:\n- Prompt injection via malicious repository content (README files, code comments, issue bodies)\n- Compromised or malicious MCP server responses\n- Crafted user instructions containing obfuscated commands\n\n— could achieve arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation. This is possible even in permission modes that require user approval for write operations, since the commands can appear to be using only read-only utilities to ultimately trigger write operations.\n\nSuccessful exploitation could lead to data exfiltration, file modification, or further system compromise.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- GitHub Copilot CLI versions prior to 0.0.423\n\n## Remediation and Mitigation\n\n### Fix\n\nThe fix adds three layers of defense:\n\n1. **Parse-time detection:** The shell safety assessment analyzes `${...}` expansion nodes within bash commands, detecting dangerous operators (`@P`, `=`, `:=`, `!`) and nested command/process substitutions. Commands containing these patterns are downgraded from read-only to write-capable, ensuring they require user approval.\n\n2. **Unconditional blocking:** Commands with dangerous expansion patterns are unconditionally blocked at the tool execution layer — regardless of permission mode (including `--yolo` / autopilot). This prevents exploitation even when all commands are auto-approved.\n\n3. **System prompt hardening:** The bash shell tool's system prompt now includes explicit instructions for the LLM to refuse executing commands with these patterns, providing a defense-in-depth layer.\n\n### User Actions\n\n1. **Upgrade** GitHub Copilot CLI to **0.0.423** or later.\n2. **Exercise caution** when working in untrusted repositories or with untrusted MCP servers.\n3. **Review** any shell commands suggested by the agent that contain complex parameter expansion patterns.",
                    "title": "github - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g8r9-g2v8-jv6f"
                },
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "## Summary\n\nA security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub Copilot CLI's shell tool that could allow arbitrary code execution through crafted bash parameter expansion patterns. An attacker who can influence the commands executed by the agent (e.g., via prompt injection through repository files, MCP server responses, or user instructions) can exploit bash parameter transformation operators to execute hidden commands, bypassing the safety assessment that classifies commands as \"read-only.\"\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability stems from how the CLI's shell safety assessment evaluates commands before execution. The safety layer parses and classifies shell commands as either read-only (safe) or write-capable (requires user approval). However, several bash parameter expansion features can embed executable code within arguments to otherwise read-only commands, causing them to appear safe while actually performing arbitrary operations.\n\nThe specific dangerous patterns are:\n\n1. **`${var@P}` — Prompt expansion:** The `@P` parameter transformation operator evaluates its value as a prompt string, which interprets embedded command substitutions. This allows hidden command execution inside what appears to be a simple variable reference.\n\n2. **`${var=value}` / `${var:=value}` — Assignment side-effects:** These forms assign values to variables as a side-effect of expansion. When chained with `@P`, an attacker can progressively build up a command substitution string across multiple expansions.\n\n3. **`${!var}` — Indirect expansion:** Dereferences an arbitrary variable name, which can be combined with other patterns to construct and execute commands dynamically.\n\n4. **Nested `$(cmd)` or `<(cmd)` inside `${...}` expansions:** Command substitution or process substitution embedded within parameter expansion default values (e.g., `${HOME:-$(whoami)}`) executes the nested command.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nThe following command appears to run a harmless `echo`, but actually executes `touch /tmp/pwned` through chained parameter expansion:\n\n```bash\necho ${a=\"$\"}${b=\"$a(touch /tmp/pwned)\"}${b@P}\n```\n\n**How it works:**\n- `${a=\"$\"}` assigns the literal `$` character to variable `a`\n- `${b=\"$a(touch /tmp/pwned)\"}` expands `$a` to `$`, constructing the string `$(touch /tmp/pwned)` and assigning it to `b`\n- `${b@P}` applies prompt expansion to `b`, which evaluates the embedded `$(touch /tmp/pwned)` command substitution\n\nPrior to the fix, the safety assessment would classify `echo` as a read-only command and allow execution without user confirmation — even in modes that normally require approval for write operations.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence command text sent to the shell tool — for example, through:\n- Prompt injection via malicious repository content (README files, code comments, issue bodies)\n- Compromised or malicious MCP server responses\n- Crafted user instructions containing obfuscated commands\n\n— could achieve arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation. This is possible even in permission modes that require user approval for write operations, since the commands can appear to be using only read-only utilities to ultimately trigger write operations.\n\nSuccessful exploitation could lead to data exfiltration, file modification, or further system compromise.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- GitHub Copilot CLI versions prior to 0.0.423\n\n## Remediation and Mitigation\n\n### Fix\n\nThe fix adds three layers of defense:\n\n1. **Parse-time detection:** The shell safety assessment analyzes `${...}` expansion nodes within bash commands, detecting dangerous operators (`@P`, `=`, `:=`, `!`) and nested command/process substitutions. Commands containing these patterns are downgraded from read-only to write-capable, ensuring they require user approval.\n\n2. **Unconditional blocking:** Commands with dangerous expansion patterns are unconditionally blocked at the tool execution layer — regardless of permission mode (including `--yolo` / autopilot). This prevents exploitation even when all commands are auto-approved.\n\n3. **System prompt hardening:** The bash shell tool's system prompt now includes explicit instructions for the LLM to refuse executing commands with these patterns, providing a defense-in-depth layer.\n\n### User Actions\n\n1. **Upgrade** GitHub Copilot CLI to **0.0.423** or later.\n2. **Exercise caution** when working in untrusted repositories or with untrusted MCP servers.\n3. **Review** any shell commands suggested by the agent that contain complex parameter expansion patterns.",
                    "title": "github - https://api.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g8r9-g2v8-jv6f"
                },
                {
                    "category": "other",
                    "text": "0.00101",
                    "title": "EPSS"
                },
                {
                    "category": "other",
                    "text": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
                    "title": "CVSSV4"
                },
                {
                    "category": "other",
                    "text": "7.5",
                    "title": "CVSSV4 base score"
                },
                {
                    "category": "other",
                    "text": "3.9",
                    "title": "NCSC Score"
                },
                {
                    "category": "other",
                    "text": "The value of the most recent EPSS score, The value of the most recent CVSS (V3) score, There is cwe data available from source Nvd",
                    "title": "NCSC Score top decreasing factors"
                }
            ],
            "product_status": {
                "known_affected": [
                    "CSAFPID-5766948",
                    "CSAFPID-5767217"
                ]
            },
            "references": [
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - nvd",
                    "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29783"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source raw - nvd",
                    "url": "https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-29783"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - cveprojectv5",
                    "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-29783"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source raw - cveprojectv5",
                    "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/29xxx/CVE-2026-29783.json"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - github",
                    "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g8r9-g2v8-jv6f"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source raw - github",
                    "url": "https://api.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g8r9-g2v8-jv6f"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - osv",
                    "url": "https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/npm%2FGHSA-g8r9-g2v8-jv6f.json?alt=media"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - first",
                    "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-29783"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source raw - first",
                    "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?limit=10000&offset=0"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - github",
                    "url": "https://api.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g8r9-g2v8-jv6f"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - first",
                    "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?limit=10000&offset=0"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - cveprojectv5; github; nvd; osv",
                    "url": "https://github.com/github/copilot-cli/releases/tag/v0.0.423"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - cveprojectv5; github; nvd; osv",
                    "url": "https://github.com/github/copilot-cli/security/advisories/GHSA-g8r9-g2v8-jv6f"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - github",
                    "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g8r9-g2v8-jv6f"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - github; osv",
                    "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29783"
                }
            ],
            "title": "CVE-2026-29783"
        }
    ]
}