{ "document": { "category": "csaf_base", "csaf_version": "2.0", "distribution": { "tlp": { "label": "WHITE" } }, "lang": "en", "notes": [ { "category": "legal_disclaimer", "text": "The Netherlands Cyber Security Center (henceforth: NCSC-NL) maintains this portal to enhance access to its information and vulnerabilities. The use of this information is subject to the following terms and conditions:\n\nThe vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal are gathered by NCSC-NL from a variety of open sources, which the user can retrieve from other platforms. NCSC-NL makes every reasonable effort to ensure that the content of this portal is kept up to date, and that it is accurate and complete. Nevertheless, NCSC-NL cannot entirely rule out the possibility of errors, and therefore cannot give any warranty in respect of its completeness, accuracy or real-time keeping up-to-date. NCSC-NL does not control nor guarantee the accuracy, relevance, timeliness or completeness of information obtained from these external sources. The vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal are intended solely for the convenience of professional parties to take appropriate measures to manage the risks posed to the cybersecurity. No rights can be derived from the information provided therein.\n\nNCSC-NL and the Kingdom of the Netherlands assume no legal liability or responsibility for any damage resulting from either the use or inability of use of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal. This includes damage resulting from the inaccuracy of incompleteness of the information contained in it.\nThe information on this page is subject to Dutch law. All disputes related to or arising from the use of this portal regarding the disclosure of vulnerabilities will be submitted to the competent court in The Hague. This choice of means also applies to the court in summary proceedings." } ], "publisher": { "category": "coordinator", "contact_details": "cert@ncsc.nl", "name": "National Cyber Security Centre", "namespace": "https://www.ncsc.nl/" }, "title": "CVE-2026-32771", "tracking": { "current_release_date": "2026-03-27T00:14:26.829662Z", "generator": { "date": "2026-02-17T15:00:00Z", "engine": { "name": "V.E.L.M.A", "version": "1.7" } }, "id": "CVE-2026-32771", "initial_release_date": "2026-03-16T22:50:57.036482Z", "revision_history": [ { "date": "2026-03-16T22:50:57.036482Z", "number": "1", "summary": "CVE created.| Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (3).| CWES updated (1)." }, { "date": "2026-03-16T22:51:06.216097Z", "number": "2", "summary": "NCSC Score created." }, { "date": "2026-03-19T15:31:07.120129Z", "number": "3", "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (3).| CWES updated (1)." }, { "date": "2026-03-20T18:23:38.787641Z", "number": "4", "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| Products created (1).| References created (3).| CWES updated (1)." }, { "date": "2026-03-20T18:23:41.220223Z", "number": "5", "summary": "NCSC Score updated." }, { "date": "2026-03-20T18:24:17.700321Z", "number": "6", "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (3).| CWES updated (1)." }, { "date": "2026-03-20T18:24:20.681108Z", "number": "7", "summary": "NCSC Score updated." }, { "date": "2026-03-20T18:37:05.752384Z", "number": "8", "summary": "Unknown change." }, { "date": "2026-03-20T21:41:58.717818Z", "number": "9", "summary": "References created (2)." }, { "date": "2026-03-20T21:59:39.605827Z", "number": "10", "summary": "Source connected.| CVE status created. (valid)| EPSS created." }, { "date": "2026-03-21T13:46:49.690856Z", "number": "11", "summary": "References removed (2)." }, { "date": "2026-03-22T00:52:12.931177Z", "number": "12", "summary": "References created (2)." }, { "date": "2026-03-22T11:25:14.393854Z", "number": "13", "summary": "References removed (2)." }, { "date": "2026-03-23T00:54:23.227607Z", "number": "14", "summary": "References created (2)." }, { "date": "2026-03-23T05:16:20.633523Z", "number": "15", "summary": "References removed (2)." }, { "date": "2026-03-24T20:56:46.194280Z", "number": "16", "summary": "References created (2)." }, { "date": "2026-03-27T00:12:58.814120Z", "number": "17", "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| Products created (1).| References created (4).| CWES updated (1)." }, { "date": "2026-03-27T00:13:04.122541Z", "number": "18", "summary": "NCSC Score updated." }, { "date": "2026-03-27T00:14:25.562632Z", "number": "19", "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| References created (4)." } ], "status": "interim", "version": "19" } }, "product_tree": { "branches": [ { "branches": [ { "branches": [ { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:unknown/<0.2.2", "product": { "name": "vers:unknown/<0.2.2", "product_id": "CSAFPID-5874280" } }, { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:unknown/>=0|<0.2.2", "product": { "name": "vers:unknown/>=0|<0.2.2", "product_id": "CSAFPID-5920131" } } ], "category": "product_name", "name": "monitoring" } ], "category": "vendor", "name": "ctfer-io" } ] }, "vulnerabilities": [ { "cve": "CVE-2026-32771", "cwe": { "id": "CWE-22", "name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')" }, "notes": [ { "category": "description", "text": "The `sanitizeArchivePath` function in `pkg/extract/extract.go` (lines 248–254) is vulnerable to a path traversal bypass due to a missing trailing path separator in the `strings.HasPrefix` check. A crafted tar archive can write files outside the intended destination directory when using the `extractor` CLI tool or the `extract.DumpOTelCollector` library function.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\nFile: `pkg/extract/extract.go`, lines 248–254\n\n```go\nfunc sanitizeArchivePath(d, t string) (v string, err error) {\n v = filepath.Join(d, t)\n if strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d)) { // ← missing trailing separator\n return v, nil\n }\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"filepath is tainted: %s\", t)\n}\n```\n\nThe function is called at line 219 inside `untar`, which is invoked by `copyFromPod` (line 205) during the Cold Extract data dump workflow.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d))` does not append a trailing `/` to the directory prefix, causing a **directory name prefix collision**. If the destination is `/home/user/extract-output` and a tar entry is named `../extract-outputevil/pwned`, the joined path `/home/user/extract-outputevil/pwned` passes the prefix check — it starts with `/home/user/extract-output` — even though it is entirely outside the intended directory.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. **Deploy the monitoring stack** with `ColdExtract: true`. The OTEL Collector begins writing signal data (`otel_traces`, `otel_metrics`, `otel_logs`) to the shared PVC.\n\n2. **Place the PoC tar on the PVC.** Any pod with write access to the `ReadWriteMany` PVC (or the compromised OTEL Collector itself) copies a `poc-path-traversal.tar` into the `/data/collector` mount path. The archive contains three real-looking OTLP telemetry files alongside two crafted entries with path-traversal names.\n\n3. **Run the extractor against the namespace:**\n\n ```\n extractor \\\n --namespace monitoring \\\n --pvc-name \\\n --directory /home/user/extract-output\n ```\n\n4. **Observe the bypass.** `untar` processes the tar stream. For the malicious entries:\n\n ```\n // entry name: ../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\n filepath.Join(\"/home/user/extract-output\", \"../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\")\n => \"/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\"\n\n strings.HasPrefix(\"/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\",\n \"/home/user/extract-output\")\n => true // BUG: prefix collision; file lands OUTSIDE target dir\n ```\n\n Both malicious entries are written outside `/home/user/extract-output/`. The three legitimate OTLP files land correctly inside it.\n\n## Impact\n\nSuccessful exploitation gives an attacker arbitrary file write on the machine running the extractor. Real-world primitives include:\n\n- Overwriting `~/.bashrc` / `~/.zshrc` / `~/.profile` for RCE on next shell login\n- Appending to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` for persistent SSH backdoor\n- Dropping a malicious entry into `~/.kube/config` to hijack cluster access\n- Writing crontab entries for persistent scheduled execution\n\nThe attack surface is widened by the default `ReadWriteMany` PVC access mode, which means any pod in the cluster with the PVC mounted can inject the payload — not just the OTEL Collector itself.", "title": "github - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25" }, { "category": "description", "text": "The `sanitizeArchivePath` function in `pkg/extract/extract.go` (lines 248–254) is vulnerable to a path traversal bypass due to a missing trailing path separator in the `strings.HasPrefix` check. A crafted tar archive can write files outside the intended destination directory when using the `extractor` CLI tool or the `extract.DumpOTelCollector` library function.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\nFile: `pkg/extract/extract.go`, lines 248–254\n\n```go\nfunc sanitizeArchivePath(d, t string) (v string, err error) {\n v = filepath.Join(d, t)\n if strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d)) { // ← missing trailing separator\n return v, nil\n }\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"filepath is tainted: %s\", t)\n}\n```\n\nThe function is called at line 219 inside `untar`, which is invoked by `copyFromPod` (line 205) during the Cold Extract data dump workflow.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d))` does not append a trailing `/` to the directory prefix, causing a **directory name prefix collision**. If the destination is `/home/user/extract-output` and a tar entry is named `../extract-outputevil/pwned`, the joined path `/home/user/extract-outputevil/pwned` passes the prefix check — it starts with `/home/user/extract-output` — even though it is entirely outside the intended directory.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. **Deploy the monitoring stack** with `ColdExtract: true`. The OTEL Collector begins writing signal data (`otel_traces`, `otel_metrics`, `otel_logs`) to the shared PVC.\n\n2. **Place the PoC tar on the PVC.** Any pod with write access to the `ReadWriteMany` PVC (or the compromised OTEL Collector itself) copies a `poc-path-traversal.tar` into the `/data/collector` mount path. The archive contains three real-looking OTLP telemetry files alongside two crafted entries with path-traversal names.\n\n3. **Run the extractor against the namespace:**\n\n ```\n extractor \\\n --namespace monitoring \\\n --pvc-name \\\n --directory /home/user/extract-output\n ```\n\n4. **Observe the bypass.** `untar` processes the tar stream. For the malicious entries:\n\n ```\n // entry name: ../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\n filepath.Join(\"/home/user/extract-output\", \"../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\")\n => \"/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\"\n\n strings.HasPrefix(\"/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\",\n \"/home/user/extract-output\")\n => true // BUG: prefix collision; file lands OUTSIDE target dir\n ```\n\n Both malicious entries are written outside `/home/user/extract-output/`. The three legitimate OTLP files land correctly inside it.\n\n## Impact\n\nSuccessful exploitation gives an attacker arbitrary file write on the machine running the extractor. Real-world primitives include:\n\n- Overwriting `~/.bashrc` / `~/.zshrc` / `~/.profile` for RCE on next shell login\n- Appending to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` for persistent SSH backdoor\n- Dropping a malicious entry into `~/.kube/config` to hijack cluster access\n- Writing crontab entries for persistent scheduled execution\n\nThe attack surface is widened by the default `ReadWriteMany` PVC access mode, which means any pod in the cluster with the PVC mounted can inject the payload — not just the OTEL Collector itself.", "title": "github - https://api.github.com/advisories/GHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25" }, { "category": "description", "text": "The CTFer.io Monitoring component is in charge of the collection, process and storage of various signals (i.e. logs, metrics and distributed traces). In versions prior to 0.2.2, the sanitizeArchivePath function in pkg/extract/extract.go (lines 248–254) is vulnerable to Path Traversal due to a missing trailing path separator in the strings.HasPrefix check. The extractor allows arbitrary file writes (e.g., overwriting shell configs, SSH keys, kubeconfig, or crontabs), enabling RCE and persistent backdoors. The attack surface is further amplified by the default ReadWriteMany PVC access mode, which lets any pod in the cluster inject a malicious payload. This issue has been fixed in version 0.2.2.", "title": "cveprojectv5 - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/32xxx/CVE-2026-32771.json" }, { "category": "description", "text": "The CTFer.io Monitoring component is in charge of the collection, process and storage of various signals (i.e. logs, metrics and distributed traces). In versions prior to 0.2.2, the sanitizeArchivePath function in pkg/extract/extract.go (lines 248–254) is vulnerable to Path Traversal due to a missing trailing path separator in the strings.HasPrefix check. The extractor allows arbitrary file writes (e.g., overwriting shell configs, SSH keys, kubeconfig, or crontabs), enabling RCE and persistent backdoors. The attack surface is further amplified by the default ReadWriteMany PVC access mode, which lets any pod in the cluster inject a malicious payload. This issue has been fixed in version 0.2.2.", "title": "nvd - https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-32771" }, { "category": "description", "text": "Monitoring is vulnerable to Archive Slip due to missing checks in sanitization in github.com/ctfer-io/monitoring", "title": "osv - https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/Go%2FGO-2026-4712.json?alt=media" }, { "category": "description", "text": "The `sanitizeArchivePath` function in `pkg/extract/extract.go` (lines 248–254) is vulnerable to a path traversal bypass due to a missing trailing path separator in the `strings.HasPrefix` check. A crafted tar archive can write files outside the intended destination directory when using the `extractor` CLI tool or the `extract.DumpOTelCollector` library function.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\nFile: `pkg/extract/extract.go`, lines 248–254\n\n```go\nfunc sanitizeArchivePath(d, t string) (v string, err error) {\n v = filepath.Join(d, t)\n if strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d)) { // ← missing trailing separator\n return v, nil\n }\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"filepath is tainted: %s\", t)\n}\n```\n\nThe function is called at line 219 inside `untar`, which is invoked by `copyFromPod` (line 205) during the Cold Extract data dump workflow.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d))` does not append a trailing `/` to the directory prefix, causing a **directory name prefix collision**. If the destination is `/home/user/extract-output` and a tar entry is named `../extract-outputevil/pwned`, the joined path `/home/user/extract-outputevil/pwned` passes the prefix check — it starts with `/home/user/extract-output` — even though it is entirely outside the intended directory.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. **Deploy the monitoring stack** with `ColdExtract: true`. The OTEL Collector begins writing signal data (`otel_traces`, `otel_metrics`, `otel_logs`) to the shared PVC.\n\n2. **Place the PoC tar on the PVC.** Any pod with write access to the `ReadWriteMany` PVC (or the compromised OTEL Collector itself) copies a `poc-path-traversal.tar` into the `/data/collector` mount path. The archive contains three real-looking OTLP telemetry files alongside two crafted entries with path-traversal names.\n\n3. **Run the extractor against the namespace:**\n\n ```\n extractor \\\n --namespace monitoring \\\n --pvc-name \\\n --directory /home/user/extract-output\n ```\n\n4. **Observe the bypass.** `untar` processes the tar stream. For the malicious entries:\n\n ```\n // entry name: ../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\n filepath.Join(\"/home/user/extract-output\", \"../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\")\n => \"/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\"\n\n strings.HasPrefix(\"/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\",\n \"/home/user/extract-output\")\n => true // BUG: prefix collision; file lands OUTSIDE target dir\n ```\n\n Both malicious entries are written outside `/home/user/extract-output/`. The three legitimate OTLP files land correctly inside it.\n\n## Impact\n\nSuccessful exploitation gives an attacker arbitrary file write on the machine running the extractor. Real-world primitives include:\n\n- Overwriting `~/.bashrc` / `~/.zshrc` / `~/.profile` for RCE on next shell login\n- Appending to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` for persistent SSH backdoor\n- Dropping a malicious entry into `~/.kube/config` to hijack cluster access\n- Writing crontab entries for persistent scheduled execution\n\nThe attack surface is widened by the default `ReadWriteMany` PVC access mode, which means any pod in the cluster with the PVC mounted can inject the payload — not just the OTEL Collector itself.", "title": "osv - https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/Go%2FGHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25.json?alt=media" }, { "category": "other", "text": "0.00059", "title": "EPSS" }, { "category": "other", "text": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:L/SA:L", "title": "CVSSV4" }, { "category": "other", "text": "8.8", "title": "CVSSV4 base score" }, { "category": "other", "text": "3.8", "title": "NCSC Score" }, { "category": "other", "text": "There is cwe data available from source Nvd, Is related to (a version of) an uncommon product, The value of the most recent CVSS (V3) score", "title": "NCSC Score top decreasing factors" } ], "product_status": { "known_affected": [ "CSAFPID-5874280", "CSAFPID-5920131" ] }, "references": [ { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - github", "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source raw - github", "url": "https://api.github.com/advisories/GHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - github", "url": "https://api.github.com/advisories/GHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - cveprojectv5", "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/32xxx/CVE-2026-32771.json" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - nvd", "url": "https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-32771" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - first", "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?limit=10000&offset=0" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - osv", "url": "https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/Go%2FGHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25.json?alt=media" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Source - osv", "url": "https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/Go%2FGO-2026-4712.json?alt=media" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Reference - cveprojectv5; github; nvd; osv", "url": "https://github.com/ctfer-io/monitoring/security/advisories/GHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Reference - cveprojectv5; github; nvd; osv", "url": "https://github.com/ctfer-io/monitoring/commit/269dba165aa42210352628c0db6756f3b8fd3c8a" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Reference - github", "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Reference - cveprojectv5; github; nvd; osv", "url": "https://security.snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability#expandable-socPI9fFAJ-title" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "Reference - github; osv", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32771" } ], "title": "CVE-2026-32771" } ] }