{
    "document": {
        "category": "csaf_base",
        "csaf_version": "2.0",
        "distribution": {
            "tlp": {
                "label": "WHITE"
            }
        },
        "lang": "en",
        "notes": [
            {
                "category": "legal_disclaimer",
                "text": "The Netherlands Cyber Security Center (henceforth: NCSC-NL) maintains this portal to enhance access to its information and vulnerabilities. The use of this information is subject to the following terms and conditions:\n\nThe vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal are gathered by NCSC-NL from a variety of open sources, which the user can retrieve from other platforms. NCSC-NL makes every reasonable effort to ensure that the content of this portal is kept up to date, and that it is accurate and complete. Nevertheless, NCSC-NL cannot entirely rule out the possibility of errors, and therefore cannot give any warranty in respect of its completeness, accuracy or real-time keeping up-to-date. NCSC-NL does not control nor guarantee the accuracy, relevance, timeliness or completeness of information obtained from these external sources. The vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal are intended solely for the convenience of professional parties to take appropriate measures to manage the risks posed to the cybersecurity. No rights can be derived from the information provided therein.\n\nNCSC-NL and the Kingdom of the Netherlands assume no legal liability or responsibility for any damage resulting from either the use or inability of use of the vulnerabilities disclosed in this portal. This includes damage resulting from the inaccuracy of incompleteness of the information contained in it.\nThe information on this page is subject to Dutch law. All disputes related to or arising from the use of this portal regarding the disclosure of vulnerabilities will be submitted to the competent court in The Hague. This choice of means also applies to the court in summary proceedings."
            }
        ],
        "publisher": {
            "category": "coordinator",
            "contact_details": "cert@ncsc.nl",
            "name": "National Cyber Security Centre",
            "namespace": "https://www.ncsc.nl/"
        },
        "title": "CVE-2026-33679",
        "tracking": {
            "current_release_date": "2026-03-30T22:13:01.098994Z",
            "generator": {
                "date": "2026-02-17T15:00:00Z",
                "engine": {
                    "name": "V.E.L.M.A",
                    "version": "1.7"
                }
            },
            "id": "CVE-2026-33679",
            "initial_release_date": "2026-03-24T20:51:33.725590Z",
            "revision_history": [
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-24T20:51:33.725590Z",
                    "number": "1",
                    "summary": "CVE created.| Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| Products connected (1).| References created (3).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-24T20:51:36.238806Z",
                    "number": "2",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score created."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-24T20:51:38.133516Z",
                    "number": "3",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (3).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-24T20:51:40.130675Z",
                    "number": "4",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-24T20:51:59.138833Z",
                    "number": "5",
                    "summary": "Unknown change."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-25T21:49:51.038983Z",
                    "number": "6",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| References created (5).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-25T21:50:00.595567Z",
                    "number": "7",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-26T00:12:46.715541Z",
                    "number": "8",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| CVSS created.| Products connected (1).| References created (4).| CWES updated (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-26T00:12:54.441785Z",
                    "number": "9",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-26T00:50:04.258144Z",
                    "number": "10",
                    "summary": "Source connected.| CVE status created. (valid)| EPSS created."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-26T00:50:17.406188Z",
                    "number": "11",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-27T00:14:04.411827Z",
                    "number": "12",
                    "summary": "Source created.| CVE status created. (valid)| Description created for source.| References created (4)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-27T00:14:06.836522Z",
                    "number": "13",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-30T14:25:08.267332Z",
                    "number": "14",
                    "summary": "Products connected (1).| Product Identifiers created (1).| Exploits created (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-30T14:25:12.972005Z",
                    "number": "15",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-30T22:12:56.068440Z",
                    "number": "16",
                    "summary": "References created (1)."
                },
                {
                    "date": "2026-03-30T22:12:58.429361Z",
                    "number": "17",
                    "summary": "NCSC Score updated."
                }
            ],
            "status": "interim",
            "version": "17"
        }
    },
    "product_tree": {
        "branches": [
            {
                "branches": [
                    {
                        "branches": [
                            {
                                "category": "product_version_range",
                                "name": "vers:unknown/>=0|<2.2.1",
                                "product": {
                                    "name": "vers:unknown/>=0|<2.2.1",
                                    "product_id": "CSAFPID-5911160"
                                }
                            }
                        ],
                        "category": "product_name",
                        "name": "api"
                    },
                    {
                        "branches": [
                            {
                                "category": "product_version_range",
                                "name": "vers:unknown/<2.2.1",
                                "product": {
                                    "name": "vers:unknown/<2.2.1",
                                    "product_id": "CSAFPID-5902472"
                                }
                            }
                        ],
                        "category": "product_name",
                        "name": "vikunja"
                    }
                ],
                "category": "vendor",
                "name": "go-vikunja"
            },
            {
                "branches": [
                    {
                        "branches": [
                            {
                                "category": "product_version_range",
                                "name": "vers:unknown/<2.2.1",
                                "product": {
                                    "name": "vers:unknown/<2.2.1",
                                    "product_id": "CSAFPID-5943812",
                                    "product_identification_helper": {
                                        "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:vikunja:vikunja:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
                                    }
                                }
                            }
                        ],
                        "category": "product_name",
                        "name": "vikunja"
                    }
                ],
                "category": "vendor",
                "name": "vikunja"
            }
        ]
    },
    "vulnerabilities": [
        {
            "cve": "CVE-2026-33679",
            "cwe": {
                "id": "CWE-918",
                "name": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)"
            },
            "notes": [
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, the `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue.",
                    "title": "cveprojectv5 - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33679.json"
                },
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, the `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue.",
                    "title": "nvd - https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-33679"
                },
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "## Summary\n\nThe `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a user authenticates via OpenID Connect, Vikunja extracts the `picture` claim from the ID token or UserInfo endpoint and passes it to `syncUserAvatarFromOpenID`, which calls `utils.DownloadImage` with the attacker-controlled URL:\n\n**Claim extraction** (`pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:70-78`):\n```go\ntype claims struct {\n\tEmail              string                   `json:\"email\"`\n\tName               string                   `json:\"name\"`\n\tPreferredUsername   string                   `json:\"preferred_username\"`\n\tNickname           string                   `json:\"nickname\"`\n\tVikunjaGroups      []map[string]interface{} `json:\"vikunja_groups\"`\n\tPicture            string                   `json:\"picture\"`\n\t// ...\n}\n```\n\n**Avatar sync trigger** (`pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:348-352`):\n```go\n// Try sync avatar if available\nerr = syncUserAvatarFromOpenID(s, u, cl.Picture)\nif err != nil {\n\tlog.Errorf(\"Error syncing avatar for user %s: %v\", u.Username, err)\n}\n```\n\n**Vulnerable download** (`pkg/utils/avatar.go:94-115`):\n```go\nfunc DownloadImage(url string) ([]byte, error) {\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create HTTP request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tresp, err := (&http.Client{}).Do(req)  // No SSRF protection\n\t// ...\n\treturn io.ReadAll(resp.Body)  // No size limit\n}\n```\n\nIn contrast, the webhook system correctly applies SSRF protection (`pkg/models/webhooks.go:306-310`):\n```go\nif !config.WebhooksAllowNonRoutableIPs.GetBool() {\n\tguardian := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())\n\ttransport.DialContext = (&net.Dialer{\n\t\tControl: guardian.Safe,\n\t}).DialContext\n}\n```\n\nThe avatar download path has none of this protection. There is no URL scheme validation, no IP address filtering, and no response body size limit.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** A Vikunja instance with OpenID Connect configured (e.g., Keycloak, Authentik). Attacker has an account on the OIDC provider.\n\n**Step 1:** Set up a listener to observe incoming requests:\n```bash\n# On attacker-controlled server or internal service\nnc -lvp 8888\n```\n\n**Step 2:** In the OIDC provider (e.g., Keycloak admin), update the attacker's user profile picture URL to an internal address:\n```\nhttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\n```\nOr to probe internal services:\n```\nhttp://internal-service:8888/admin\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Log in to Vikunja via the OIDC provider. After the callback completes, the Vikunja server will make a GET request from its own network context to the URL set in the picture claim.\n\n**Step 4:** Observe the request arriving at the internal endpoint or listener. The request originates from the Vikunja server's IP, bypassing any network-level access controls that allow Vikunja server traffic.\n\n**Cloud metadata example (AWS):**\n```\n# Set picture URL to:\nhttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\n\n# Vikunja server makes GET to this URL from its own network context\n# The response is read into memory (io.ReadAll) before image.Decode fails\n# The HTTP request itself reaches the metadata service\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata access:** Attacker can reach cloud instance metadata services (AWS IMDSv1 at `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure equivalents) from the Vikunja server's network position, potentially leaking IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data.\n- **Internal network reconnaissance:** Port scanning and service discovery of internal hosts reachable from the Vikunja server by observing response timing and error messages.\n- **Internal service interaction:** Any internal service that acts on GET requests (cache purges, status endpoints, admin panels) can be triggered.\n- **Memory pressure:** The `io.ReadAll` call with no size limit means pointing the URL at a large resource could cause memory exhaustion on the Vikunja server, though the 3-second timeout partially mitigates this.\n- **Repeated exploitation:** The SSRF triggers on every OIDC login, allowing the attacker to iterate through different internal URLs by updating their OIDC profile between logins.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply the same SSRF protection used in webhooks to `DownloadImage`, and add a response body size limit:\n\n```go\n// pkg/utils/avatar.go\nimport (\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"code.dny.dev/ssrf\"\n)\n\nfunc DownloadImage(url string) ([]byte, error) {\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create HTTP request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// SSRF protection: block requests to non-globally-routable IPs\n\tguardian := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())\n\tclient := &http.Client{\n\t\tTransport: &http.Transport{\n\t\t\tDialContext: (&net.Dialer{\n\t\t\t\tControl: guardian.Safe,\n\t\t\t}).DialContext,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tresp, err := client.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to download image: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to download image, status code: %d\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\n\t// Limit response body to 10MB to prevent memory exhaustion\n\tconst maxAvatarSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024\n\treturn io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxAvatarSize))\n}\n```",
                    "title": "github - https://api.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63"
                },
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "## Summary\n\nThe `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a user authenticates via OpenID Connect, Vikunja extracts the `picture` claim from the ID token or UserInfo endpoint and passes it to `syncUserAvatarFromOpenID`, which calls `utils.DownloadImage` with the attacker-controlled URL:\n\n**Claim extraction** (`pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:70-78`):\n```go\ntype claims struct {\n\tEmail              string                   `json:\"email\"`\n\tName               string                   `json:\"name\"`\n\tPreferredUsername   string                   `json:\"preferred_username\"`\n\tNickname           string                   `json:\"nickname\"`\n\tVikunjaGroups      []map[string]interface{} `json:\"vikunja_groups\"`\n\tPicture            string                   `json:\"picture\"`\n\t// ...\n}\n```\n\n**Avatar sync trigger** (`pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:348-352`):\n```go\n// Try sync avatar if available\nerr = syncUserAvatarFromOpenID(s, u, cl.Picture)\nif err != nil {\n\tlog.Errorf(\"Error syncing avatar for user %s: %v\", u.Username, err)\n}\n```\n\n**Vulnerable download** (`pkg/utils/avatar.go:94-115`):\n```go\nfunc DownloadImage(url string) ([]byte, error) {\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create HTTP request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tresp, err := (&http.Client{}).Do(req)  // No SSRF protection\n\t// ...\n\treturn io.ReadAll(resp.Body)  // No size limit\n}\n```\n\nIn contrast, the webhook system correctly applies SSRF protection (`pkg/models/webhooks.go:306-310`):\n```go\nif !config.WebhooksAllowNonRoutableIPs.GetBool() {\n\tguardian := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())\n\ttransport.DialContext = (&net.Dialer{\n\t\tControl: guardian.Safe,\n\t}).DialContext\n}\n```\n\nThe avatar download path has none of this protection. There is no URL scheme validation, no IP address filtering, and no response body size limit.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** A Vikunja instance with OpenID Connect configured (e.g., Keycloak, Authentik). Attacker has an account on the OIDC provider.\n\n**Step 1:** Set up a listener to observe incoming requests:\n```bash\n# On attacker-controlled server or internal service\nnc -lvp 8888\n```\n\n**Step 2:** In the OIDC provider (e.g., Keycloak admin), update the attacker's user profile picture URL to an internal address:\n```\nhttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\n```\nOr to probe internal services:\n```\nhttp://internal-service:8888/admin\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Log in to Vikunja via the OIDC provider. After the callback completes, the Vikunja server will make a GET request from its own network context to the URL set in the picture claim.\n\n**Step 4:** Observe the request arriving at the internal endpoint or listener. The request originates from the Vikunja server's IP, bypassing any network-level access controls that allow Vikunja server traffic.\n\n**Cloud metadata example (AWS):**\n```\n# Set picture URL to:\nhttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\n\n# Vikunja server makes GET to this URL from its own network context\n# The response is read into memory (io.ReadAll) before image.Decode fails\n# The HTTP request itself reaches the metadata service\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata access:** Attacker can reach cloud instance metadata services (AWS IMDSv1 at `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure equivalents) from the Vikunja server's network position, potentially leaking IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data.\n- **Internal network reconnaissance:** Port scanning and service discovery of internal hosts reachable from the Vikunja server by observing response timing and error messages.\n- **Internal service interaction:** Any internal service that acts on GET requests (cache purges, status endpoints, admin panels) can be triggered.\n- **Memory pressure:** The `io.ReadAll` call with no size limit means pointing the URL at a large resource could cause memory exhaustion on the Vikunja server, though the 3-second timeout partially mitigates this.\n- **Repeated exploitation:** The SSRF triggers on every OIDC login, allowing the attacker to iterate through different internal URLs by updating their OIDC profile between logins.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply the same SSRF protection used in webhooks to `DownloadImage`, and add a response body size limit:\n\n```go\n// pkg/utils/avatar.go\nimport (\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"code.dny.dev/ssrf\"\n)\n\nfunc DownloadImage(url string) ([]byte, error) {\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create HTTP request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// SSRF protection: block requests to non-globally-routable IPs\n\tguardian := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())\n\tclient := &http.Client{\n\t\tTransport: &http.Transport{\n\t\t\tDialContext: (&net.Dialer{\n\t\t\t\tControl: guardian.Safe,\n\t\t\t}).DialContext,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tresp, err := client.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to download image: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to download image, status code: %d\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\n\t// Limit response body to 10MB to prevent memory exhaustion\n\tconst maxAvatarSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024\n\treturn io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxAvatarSize))\n}\n```",
                    "title": "osv - https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/Go%2FGHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63.json?alt=media"
                },
                {
                    "category": "description",
                    "text": "Vikjuna Bypasses Webhook SSRF Protections During OpenID Connect Avatar Download in code.vikunja.io/api.\n\nNOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.\n\n(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)\n\nThe additional affected modules and versions are: code.vikunja.io/api before v2.2.1.",
                    "title": "osv - https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/Go%2FGO-2026-4852.json?alt=media"
                },
                {
                    "category": "other",
                    "text": "0.00034",
                    "title": "EPSS"
                },
                {
                    "category": "other",
                    "text": "3.4",
                    "title": "NCSC Score"
                },
                {
                    "category": "other",
                    "text": "The value of the most recent EPSS score, Exploit code publicly available, Is related to (a version of) an uncommon product, There is exploit data available from source Nvd, The value of the most recent CVSS (V3) score",
                    "title": "NCSC Score top decreasing factors"
                }
            ],
            "product_status": {
                "known_affected": [
                    "CSAFPID-5902472",
                    "CSAFPID-5911160",
                    "CSAFPID-5943812"
                ]
            },
            "references": [
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - cveprojectv5",
                    "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33679.json"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - nvd",
                    "url": "https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-33679"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - github",
                    "url": "https://api.github.com/advisories/GHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - osv",
                    "url": "https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/Go%2FGHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63.json?alt=media"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - first",
                    "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?limit=10000&offset=0"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Source - osv",
                    "url": "https://www.googleapis.com/download/storage/v1/b/osv-vulnerabilities/o/Go%2FGO-2026-4852.json?alt=media"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - cveprojectv5; github; nvd; osv",
                    "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - cveprojectv5; github; nvd; osv",
                    "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/363aa6642352b08fc8bc6aaff2f3a550393af1cf"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - cveprojectv5; github; nvd; osv",
                    "url": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.2-was-released"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - github; osv",
                    "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33679"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - github",
                    "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63"
                },
                {
                    "category": "external",
                    "summary": "Reference - github",
                    "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4852"
                }
            ],
            "scores": [
                {
                    "cvss_v3": {
                        "version": "3.1",
                        "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L",
                        "baseScore": 6.4,
                        "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM"
                    },
                    "products": [
                        "CSAFPID-5902472",
                        "CSAFPID-5911160",
                        "CSAFPID-5943812"
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "title": "CVE-2026-33679"
        }
    ]
}